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Protection of the Environment and the 
International Salvage Convention 1989: An 
Assessment 
Abstract 
This article focuses on the International Salvage Convention and the 
protection of the environment in salvage operations. The article traces the 
evolution and history of the law of Salvage to its present status today using the 
UK as a case study. In essence, this article seeks to ascertain the extent of 
current international regime on salvage in protecting the environment. The 
question that this article poses is: Does the International Salvage Convention 
1989 accord enough protection to the environment against the backdrop of 
global efforts to promote environmental protection and sustainable 
development? This article begins with a brief synopsis of the underlying 
principles of salvage including the rule of ‘no cure-no pay’ followed by an 
appraisal of the events that culminated arguably in the development of the 
International Salvage Convention 1989 to safeguard the environment in the 
course of salvage operations. A systematic analysis of the defects inherent in 
the International Salvage Convention 1989 vis-à-vis protection of the 
environment will be attempted, while a number of reforms will also be 
suggested. 
1. Introduction 
This article is divided into six sections. The first part of the article will dwell on the 
history and evolution of salvage. The modern concept of salvage which can traced to 
the United Kingdom (hereinafter ‘UK’),1 hence the city of London and the United 
Kingdom occupy special place in the international salvage paradigm. This article will 
be accentuated with copious references to the UK. The second part of the article will 
focus on the subject matter of salvage. Definitions of terms such as ‘vessel’, ‘ship’ or 
‘maritime property’ will be elucidated upon. A major reason for focusing on these 
definitions is to highlight the evolution of the different meanings ascribed to these 
terms. The third part of the article will highlight the three elements of salvage: danger, 
voluntariness and success. These elements are at the core of the law of salvage. The 
fourth part of the paper will focus on environmental protection in salvage operations. 
                                                          
1 The origins of salvage are ancient and existed in old legal systems such as the Roman epoch 
amongst others. The Law of Salvage’s core principles were established in the nineteenth century 
and the Admiralty Courts in England played major roles in the modern development of the law 
of Salvage. Generally, see Olivia Lennox-King, ‘Laying the Mark to Port and Starboard: Salvage 
under duress and Economic duress at Contract Law’ (2007) 21 A& NZ March LJ 31, 32 and 
Catherine Swan, ‘The Restitutionary and Economic Analyses of Salvage Law’ (2009) 23 A&NZ 
Mar LJ 99. However, see Steckley, G.F. ‘The Seventeenth-Century Origins of Modern Salvage 
Law’ (2014) 35(3) The Journal of Legal History 209 
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Many salvage operations have had negative impacts on the environment, thus, this 
paper will highlight the role of the International Salvage Convention 1989 2  in 
protecting the environment. The fifth part of the article will suggest some reforms to 
improve protection of the environment in the international salvage paradigm. Also, 
this article will consider if the development of a separate environmental salvage 
award will be the panacea to some of the weaknesses in environmental protection in 
salvage operations.  The sixth part will be the concluding section of the article. 
1.1  The History and Evolution of Salvage 
Salvage is traditionally concerned with the salving or preservation of property in peril 
at sea3and it is unique to maritime law.4 If a person willingly rescuesthe property of 
another person on land, he gets no reward. However, if the same service is performed 
at sea, the person salving the maritime property, the ‘salvor’, will be entitled to a 
reward, not exceeding the value of the property salved.5Salvors are provided special 
incentives in addition to the compensation due to them because of the risks taken in 
coming to a distressed ship’s aid.Kennedy also defined salvage in the same 
vein.6Brice7 defined salvage as a right which: 
 arises when a person acting as a volunteer (that is, without any pre – 
 existing contractual or other legal duty so to act) preserves or 
 contributes to preserving at sea any vessel, cargo, freight or other 
 recognised subject of salvage from danger.8 
In the law of Salvage, no matter the efforts of the salvor, if the endeavour is 
unsuccessful, no reward is given. This is the legal reasoning behind the doctrine of 
‘no cure-no pay’ doctrine. According to Mandaraka-Sheppard, ‘the right to reward, 
rather than remuneration, arises from the fact that salvage is a mixed question of a 
private right and public policy’.9 
                                                          
2International Convention on Salvage, 1989. Drafted by the Comite Maritime International (CMI) 
under the auspices of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). Also referred to as the 
Salvage Convention 1989 or the London Salvage Convention 
<http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/imo.salvage.convention.1989/doc.html> accessed 1 January 2015. 
3 Geoffrey Brice,Brice on Maritime Law of Salvage (4thedn, Sweet and Maxwell 2003) 397.   
4 ibid. 
5  Simon Baughen, Shipping Law (5th edn, Routledge 2012) 274.  
6  DW Steel and Rose FD,Kennedy’s Law of Salvage   (5thedn, Steven and Sons, 1985) 8. 
7 Brice (n 3) 1. 
8 ibid. 
9AlekaMandaraka–Sheppard,Modern Admiralty Law (1stedn, Cavendish 2001) 650. According to 
Richard Shaw and  MikisTsimplis ‘The Liabilities of the Vessel’ in Yvonne Baatz (ed), Maritime 
Law (2edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011),250-251, who posit that the public policy in salvage 
operations encompasses three elements –‘first, recognising that such assistance entitles the 
salvors of the property to a salvage reward; second, that the right to a salvage reward arises at the 
time of rendering assistance irrespective of any contract; and third, that this right is protected by 
a maritime claim of the highest priority, the salvage lien, and a right to arrest the salved property 
by an action in rem.’ 
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The framework of the current law on Salvage was first established by the decisions of 
the Admiralty Court in the UK in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.10During 
this time, salvage was purely voluntary and more often than not, ‘often non-
contractual, rendered by ordinary ships that happened to be passing the distressed 
ship.’11 Thus, prior to the end of the nineteenth century, express salvage contracts 
were unknown.12 
Presently, salvage is mainly performed by trained or professional salvors that are 
usually contracted for their services. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a 
unique form of contract – Lloyd’s Open Form (hereinafter ‘LOF’) evolved and it 
coincided with the substantial usage of steamships and tugs.13Salvage agreements 
became more common, and by the nineteenth century, a Lloyd’s Form of Salvage 
Agreement ‘No Cure – No Pay’- (sometimes known as ‘Lloyd’s Standard Form’ or 
‘Lloyd’s Open Form’) first came to be used, soon to be superseded and improved 
during the course of the twentieth century, culminating in ‘LOF 2000.’14Furthermore, 
in 2011, the LOF underwent some changes and this is reflected in LOF 2011.15 In The 
Unique Mariner, Brandon J said that theLOF contract has been judicially categorised 
as one for work or labour which is only subject to the principles of Salvage law in so 
far as these have been expressly or impliedly incorporated into it.16 Here, in non-
contractual (implied) salvage,  
the salvor and salvee owe only minimal duties towards one another. The 
salvor owes a duty of care in respect of any services that it actually performs, 
but it owes no duty to perform those services. It is free to cease work at any 
time it chooses... The position is quite different with a contractual 
salvor…LOF imposes an additional duty on the salvor to use its best 
endeavours to salve the ship and its cargo.17 
The LOF is the most widely used ‘no cure – no pay’ salvage contract. Under a LOF 
contract, in return for salvage services, the salvor receives a proportion of the ‘salved 
                                                          
10  Baughen (n 5) 275. 
11 Baughen ibid 
12 ibid 651 
13 The LOF is a type of contract that is widely used in the international salvage industry. It 
contains the ‘No Cure-No Pay’ principle in salvage operations. The first LOF was approved in 
1892 and it has been used in the salvage industry for more than one hundred years. Generally, 
the LOF provides for England as the appropriate forum for litigation and London for arbitration. 
However, different types of salvage contracts exist in other parts of the world, for example, 
China, Russia and Japan. See Graham Daines, ‘Lloyd’s Open Form and Special Compensation 
P & I Clause (SCOPIC) (2002). 
<http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Salvage%20Convention/Graham%20Daines%20-
%20Scopic%20Paper.pdf> accessed 10 February 2015. 
14  Brice (n 3) 5. 
15 Baughen (n 5). The changes inherent in the LOF 2011 will be analysed in a subsequent section 
of this article. 
16The Unique Mariner (No 2) [1979] I Lloyd’s Rep 37. 
17 Baughen (n 5) at 294 
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value’ (the value of ship, its bunkers and cargo).18A major distinction between the 
LOF and the traditional principles of salvage is that ‘under the LOF, salvage is 
admitted, thereby obviating the need for the salvor to show that the vessel was in 
danger at the time that the agreement was made.’19 As highlighted above, there have 
been various updates of the LOF culminating in the LOF 2011. The LOF 1980 was 
the impetus for the development of the 1989 International Salvage Convention.20 The 
LOF contained provisions on environmental risks and protection in salvage operations 
and these provisions were added to the 1989 Convention. In essence, the LOF protects 
salvors from the hazards or risks inherent in salvage operations by providing them 
with incentives (such as financial incentives) to balance their losses.      
2        The Subject Matter of Salvage   
Prior to the development of the International Salvage Convention 1989, the subject 
matter of ‘salvage’ as found in English law was vague and ambiguous. For example, 
section 742 of the 1894 Merchant Shipping Act (now abolished)21 defined a ‘vessel’ 
to ‘include any ship or boat, or any other description of vessel used in navigation not 
propelled by oars.’ According to Mandaraka-Sheppard, this definition was circular 
and she avers that the definition which entails ‘that a vessel includes a ship and a ship 
includes a vessel does not help much by way of definition.’22 Thus, this definition of a 
ship as encapsulated in the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 was ambiguous and was 
subjected to diverse meanings or interpretations. For example, in The Gas Float 
Whitton (No.2)23which concerned a structure that was shaped like a ships. The House 
of Lords held that the structure was not a ship within the meaning of the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1894 and also that a salvage reward is not available to any person in 
respect of anything that is not a ship, part of a ship or cargo. Marsden criticised this 
judgment on the basis of it not being in accordance with the practice of the Admiralty 
courts which had prevailed for at least three centuries prior to the judgment.24The 
decision in The GasFloat Whitton(No 2)is an example of the effect of ambiguity 
contained in the definition of ‘vessel’ in the 1894 Merchant Shipping Act. 
This definition of a vessel has been now discarded. The phrase ‘not propelled by oars’ 
has been omitted from the definition of a ‘ship.’ It was removed by virtue of the 
Merchant Shipping (Registration) Act 1993,25 enacted into the Merchant Shipping Act 
1995.26Section 313(1) of the latter Act defines a ship to include any vessel used in 
                                                          
18<http://www.marine-salvage.com/overview/index.asp?page=no_cure_no_pay.htm> accessed 2 
January 2015. 
19 Baughen (n 5) at 274 
20 Baughen ibid 
21 The Merchant Shipping Act 1894. 
22Mandaraka-Sheppard (n 9) 15. 
23 [1897] AC 339. 
24  RG Marsden, ‘Admiralty Droits and Salvage’ (1899) L.Q.R 354. 
25 The Merchant Shipping (Registration) Act 1993. 
26Mandaraka-Sheppard (n 9). 
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navigation. The International Salvage Convention 198927defines a ship in Article 1(b) 
to include any ship, craft or any structure capable of navigation. 
Other types of traditional maritime property that can be subject to salvage are freight 
and cargo. Cargo is subject to salvage irrespective of whether it is owned by a ship 
owner or by a third party or whether or not it is carried under a bill of lading.28 In the 
Gas Float Whitton (No.2), cargo was held to qualify as a subject matter of 
salvage. 29 Article 1(c) of the International Salvage Convention 1989 defines a 
maritime property as any property not permanently and intentionally attached to the 
shoreline and includes freight at risk. This provision includes goods or merchandise 
on ships but it is not inclusive of the personal effects of master (or crew) and 
passengers.Article 1(c) of International Salvage Convention30 makes freight subject to 
salvage. Freight is the remuneration due and payable for the carriage of cargo and not 
hire for the use of ships. 31  Also, ‘cargo adrift or sunken ships’ (ship wrecks) 
islikewise subject to the law of Salvage.32 
Non–maritime property can also be subject to the law of Salvage. Generally, an 
aircraft cannot be termed a maritime property but it maybe entitled to salvage under 
Section 87(1) of the Civil Aviation Act 1982. 33  Similarly, this treatment is also 
extended to hovercrafts by virtue of Sections 1 and 2 of the Hovercraft Act 1968.34 
Here, ships, hovercrafts and other similar structures capable of navigation or 
movement and other such property that are not permanent fixtures on shores are 
subject to the law of Salvage.35 
As a general rule, platforms and drilling units are not subject to salvage by virtue of 
Article 3 of the Salvage Convention 1989.36 However, there are a few exceptions to 
this rule. When such structures are engaged in the act of drilling, the law of Salvage is 
not applicable to such structures, however when such platforms or drilling units are in 
navigation, they become subject to the law of Salvage.37 
Furthermore, by virtue of Article 4, of Schedule 11 of the Merchant Shipping Act 
199538, the International Salvage Convention 198939 does not apply to warships or 
                                                          
27 (n 2). 
28Baughen (n 5) 
29  (No.2) [1897] A.C 339. 
30 ibid. 
31Mandaraka-Sheppard (n 9) 660. 
32 Institute of Maritime Law Southampton on Shipping Law (Istedn, Informa 2008) 163. 
33The Civil Aviation Act 1982. Also, in respect of saving of lives at sea, ‘will not, by itself justify 
a claim for salvage if it is not connected with the salvage of some maritime property’ Baughen 
(n 5) 277. Also see Ethan Zubic ‘Pure versus Contract Salvage-Narrowing the Scope of an 
Agreement to Volunteer Bar to Pure Salvage.’ (2010 -2011) 10 Loyola Maritime Law Journal 
145, 149-150 
34The Hovercraft Act 1968. 
35 Institute of Maritime Law (n 32).  
36 (n 2). 
37 Institute of Maritime Law (n 32). 
38 Merchant Shipping Act 1995. 
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non-commercial vessels owned or operated by a country or State and entitled at the 
time of salvage operations to sovereign immunity under international law unless that 
State allows it. In the UK, Section 230 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 deals with 
salvage claims by or against the Crown. 
3   Elements of Salvage 
The principal elements of salvage are threefold: danger, voluntariness and success.40 
3.1 Danger 
Before, any ship or vessel at sea can be subject to salvage, the ship must be in danger. 
The danger which may be actual or a likelihood of real danger, must expose the 
property to the possibility of damage. An apprehension of danger will suffice as long 
it is not a fanciful danger and it does not have to be immediate or absolute.41 In the 
Phantom, Lord Lushington stated inter alia that – ‘it is not necessary that there should 
be absolute danger in order to constitute salvage services, it is sufficient if there is a 
state of difficulty, and reasonable apprehension’.42 
Danger can be categorised into future or contingent danger and danger to third parties 
or the environment. Future danger is known as the ‘Troilus danger’. In the Troilus 
case, a steamship carrying cargo to Liverpool lost her propeller in the Indian Ocean, 
and therefore accepted assistance from a motor – vessel which towed her to safety to 
Aden where unfortunately she could not be repaired and where there were no facilities 
for discharging and storing the cargo.43 The court held that although the ship and 
cargo were in physical safety at Aden, the services in question were salvage services.    
In the case of a danger to third parties, the salvor can claim a reward if he successfully 
prevents damage affecting the interests of a third party.  If a salvor successfully saves 
a maritime property and at the same time helps in reducing the damage that would 
have been caused to a third party, he is entitled to a reward from the salvee (the owner 
of the vessel). 
In the area of danger to the environment, Article 1(d) of the Salvage Convention 
states thus:  
                                                                                                                                                                      
39  (n 2). 
40 Some authors contend that there are more than three principles or elements of salvage. Herein, 
the principles or ingredients of salvage (under customary international law) are danger, 
voluntariness, success, place of rendering the services and the type of property salved. For 
example, see William Tetley, Maritime Liens and Claims, (2nd edn, International Shipping 
Publications 1998) and Natalia Malashkina, Law Reform in the International Regime of 
Salvage: The Insurance Perspective (Master’s Thesis, Lund University, Spring 2010) 
<http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=1698365&fileOId=169836
9> accessed 2 January 2013. 
41 Mandaraka-Sheppard (n 9) 662. 
42  [1866] L.R. 1 A and E 58 at 60, cited in Mandaraka-Sheppard (n 9) 663. 
43  [1951] AC 820. 
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[d]amage to the environment means substantial physical damage to human 
health or to marine life or resources in coastal or inland waters or areas 
adjacent thereto, caused by pollution, contamination, fire, explosion or 
similar incidents.44 
This aspect of danger to the environment shall be discussed in a detailed manner at a 
later part of this article. 
               3.2   Voluntary Services (Voluntariness) 
 In the law of salvage, voluntariness means salvage services rendered without any 
prior or pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties.45 Voluntariness also 
includes services not done in the line of official duty or for self-preservation. As long 
as the persons are recognised by law as volunteers and they render salvage services, 
they are entitled to salvage remuneration.46 In The Sava Star, Clarke J posited that 
‘there are no rigid categories of salvors. They include any volunteer who renders 
services of a salvage nature.’47 
In the International Salvage Convention 1989, there is no express provision on the 
rules guiding voluntariness of salvors in salvage operations.48 However, it has been 
contended that Article 17 of the International Salvage Convention 1989, by 
implication lays down rules ‘for the recovery of salvage and certain qualifications.’49 
The said Article states that: 
 [n]o payment is due under the provisions of the Convention unless 
 services rendered exceed what can be reasonably considered as due 
 performance of a contract entered into before the danger arose.  
Voluntary services in salvage operations can manifest in different circumstances. An 
example will suffice at this juncture.50Generally, in salvage operations, individuals 
(for example, ship’s master and crew) who have entered agreements with the ship 
owner prior to the existence of danger are not recognised as salvors.51 The reason is 
because they have an already existing obligation or duty to protect and preserve the 
ship and cargo.52 In The Neptune, Lord Stowelldescribes a ‘volunteer’ as:  ‘[a] person 
who, without any particular relation to ship in distress, proffers useful service, and 
                                                          
44  (n 2). 
45 Mandaraka-Sheppard (n 9). 
46  ibid 668. 
47 [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep, 141. Also cited in Mandaraka-Sheppard (n 9) 668. 
48  Mandaraka-Sheppard (n 9). Francis D. Rose, Kennedy and Rose: The Law of Salvage (6thedn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2002) 243. 
49 Rose (n 48) 242. 
50  For an extensive analysis of voluntary services in salvage operations, see Mandaraka-Sheppard 
(n 9) 668-683 and Rose (n 48) 243-265. 
51Mandaraka-Sheppard (n 9). 
52 ibid. 
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gives it as a volunteer adventurer, without any pre-existing covenant that connected 
him with the duty of employing himself for the preservation of that ship.’53 
However, this rule that individuals with contractual agreements with a ship owner 
cannot be volunteers is subject to some exceptions.  For example, in The Demetrio, 
the court held that the plaintiffs who were crew members in a vessel that was attacked 
and abandoned as a result of the orders of the captain were entitled to salvage rewards 
after they successfully extinguished the fire on the ship at great risks to their safety.54 
3.3Success 
 This is the most important element of a salvage operation. Traditionally, if a salvage 
operation is not successful, the salvor is not entitled to reward. This doctrine is known 
as the ‘No Cure – No Pay’ doctrine. Thus, the principles of traditional salvage did not 
provide for an award for environmental protection where no property was saved.55 
However, the 1989 Salvage Convention recognizes the need to protect the 
environment in its provisions. For example, the preamble to the Convention highlights 
the need to protect the environment. Also,by virtue of Article 13(b) of the 
International Salvage Convention, the skill and effort of the salvors in preventing or 
minimising damage to the environment may be a factor in determining a salvage 
award. Thus, the protection of the environment in salvage operations is an exception 
to this principle of ‘No cure – No pay’. It will be addressed in a subsequent part of the 
article. 
3.3.1 No Cure – No Pay Doctrine 
The justification of the principle is the payment from the salvaged property and not 
the successful salving of the property. If the vessel in distress is lost or destroyed 
during the salvage operation, no reward will be awarded. The reason behind the 
principle is that;the salvage award is paid out of the salved property. If the vessel is 
destroyed, there would be no basis for any payment to be made to the salvor. 
Even if a distressed vessel was rescued from peril at sea, a salvor who claims a 
salvage reward must prove that he has contributed to the vessel being rescued or 
salved. This principle was amplified by Lord Phillimore in SS Melanie v. SS San 
Onofre,56who stated thus: 
                                                          
53 (1824) 1 Hagg. 227. 
54 (1941) 69 LIL Rep 5. 
55Beale, G. ‘Environmental Salvage and the 1989 Salvage Convention: Proposed Amendments to 
the Convention and Difficulties in Quantifying an Environmental Salvage Award’ (2014) 16 (4) 
Environmental Law Review 248,  
56  [1925] A.C. 246. 
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success is necessary for a salvage award. Contributions to that success, or as 
it is sometime expressed meritorious contributions to that success, give title 
to salvage reward.57 
In Marguerite Molinos, a life boat which sent out telegraphs to tugs before going to 
rescue a distressed vessel was held not to be entitled to a salvage reward.58Here, the 
onus of proof fell on the life boat crew who had gone out for the purposes of saving 
lives to prove that they were entitled to the salvage reward against the property in 
peril or salved. In this case, the life boat crew members were considered not to be 
salvors. The basis for this decision was that the message in the telegraph was not 
instrumental in salving the property. This principle can sometimes lead to or 
perpetuate injustice.59  This was exemplified in the ‘1979 incident of The Aegean 
Captain and The Atlantic Express. The salvors prevented an oil spill washing up on 
the beaches of Tobago by towing a badly leaking and ablaze Atlantic Empress far out 
to sea. The ship then exploded and sank. The salvors received no reward.’60 
In The Benlarig, a vessel which was damaged in a salvage operation was held not to 
be entitled to any salvage reward.61The master of the salvor vessel proceeded to 
Gibraltar (wherein the distressed vessel was expected to be towed to) and gave 
information on the location and condition of the distressed vessel. The efforts of the 
salving vessel and the information provided by the master to the subsequent salvor 
were not considered by the court. Thus, the court held that the original salvor was not 
entitled to a salvage reward in the salvage operations which left the distressed vessel 
in a more precarious condition.62 However, in the TheCameillia, the court held that if 
a distressed vessel is left at a place of safety, the original salvor may be entitled to a 
salvage reward if the distressed vessel is ultimately salved.63 
Fortunately, there is an exception to the No cure-No pay principle. The exception is 
that when a distressed vessel calls for assistance, any vessel that heeds to such a call 
even though it does not contribute to the eventual salving of the vessel is entitled to a 
salvage award. The rationale for this can be gleaned from the dicta of Dr. Lushington 
in The Undaunted where he stated that - ‘[t]he engagement to render assistance to a 
vessel in distress, and the performance of that agreement so far as necessary or far as 
possible, establish a title to salvage reward’.64 
The principle of ‘No Cure - No Pay’has caused a lot of difficulties to professional 
salvors in the salvage industry. Salvors were naturally against it, especially since they 
received no reward after spending money and resources on the salvage operations, 
                                                          
57  ibid 262. 
58  [1903] P. 160 cited in NJJ Gaskell and others ‘Chorley and Giles’ Shipping Law (8edn, 
Financial Times Management 1987) 441. 
59  Baughen (n 5) 287. 
60 Beale (n 55) 249 
61  (1888) 14 PD 3 cited in Baughen (n 5) 283. 
62  Baughen (n 5). 
63 (1883) 9 PD 27 cited in Baughen (n 5) 283. 
64  (1860) Lush 92 (Dr Lushington) cited in Baughen (n 5) 283.  
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despite the salvage operation beingunsuccessful.There is also no reward for salvors 
‘for attending a mid-ocean casualty which did not cause a threat of damage to the 
environment in coastal or adjacent waters’.65This principle of ‘No Cure No Pay’ has 
also been somewhat mitigated particularly in the area of environmental protection 
which shall be explained in further detail in the next part of this article. 
        4 Protection of the Environment and Salvage Operations 
There exists an exception against the rigid principle of ‘No Cure – No Pay’ which 
relates to the efforts of salvors in preventing damage to the environment from oil 
laden ships.The problems associated with the salvage of oil laden ships are numerous. 
For example, oil may escape during salvage operations and the salvors may be held 
culpable for the resultant environmental pollution.66Furthermore, due to the fear of the 
environmental impacts of salvage operations involving oil laden ships, it is common 
practice that governments of coastal states refuse to provide places of refuge to such 
vessels. Consequently, salvors are left with the option of towing the stricken vessels 
into the far recesses of the oceans to sink such vessels.67Salvors may lose the salvage 
rewards if the salvage operation is unsuccessful and in some instances when the 
salvage operation is successful, the worth of the salved property may serve as a 
disincentive for salvors to undertake such (risky) salvage operations.68 Arguably, this 
is because salvors will lose their reward since they have to sink the ship, so they 
would not be interested in salving a vessel that poses an environmental threat so they 
are unwilling to help such vessels without an exception to the no-cure no pay 
principle. 
During the last century, larger steamships have been built for the carriage of 
hazardous materials over the sea. This development has led to many incidents of 
pollution. The first major pollution incident that occurred was the Torrey Canyon 
disaster in 1967; a Liberian oil vessel which spilled more than a million barrels of oil 
as a result of its grounding near the south west of England.69 The tugs that were 
engaged to salve the tanker were unsuccessful. Inevitably, the salvors could not claim 
salvage because they did not salve the vessel.70 
 A worse incident took place in 1978 in the Amoco Cadiz case which centred on a 
very large crude carrier (hereinafter ‘VLCC’). 71  During a trip to Rotterdam, its 
steering gear failed and it broke in half spilling 223,000 tonnes of crude oil. The oil 
                                                          
65 Colin de la Rue and Charles B Anderson ‘Environmental Salvage – Plus ca change…?’(2012) 
18 JIML 285. Presently, salvors are entitled to some reward if they successfully prevent damage 
(from oil laden ships) to the environment.  
66 Baughen (n 5). 
67  Archie Bishop, ‘The Development of Environmental Salvage and Review of the London 
Salvage Convention 1989’ (2012) 37 Tul. Mar. L.J. 65. This refusal by governments to provide 
places of refuge for such vessels is termed ‘the Maritime Leper Syndrome’ 
68 Baughen (n 5). 
69 Generally see Bishop (n 67) 
70  [1969] 2 Lloyd’s Law Rep 591. 
71  [1948] 2 Lloyd’s Law Rep 305. 
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spill spread across 125 miles off the coast of Brittany, destroying fisheries, oyster and 
seaweed beds, and polluting beaches despite the efforts of 10,000 French soldiers 
deployed to clean the beach.72 According to Redgwell, the Amoco Cadiz disaster gave 
the impetus for a number of changes in the law of Salvage.73A lot of pressure was 
exerted by salvors seeking rewards commensurate with their services rendered and 
coastal states seeking to avoid environmental disasters.74 This prompted an immediate 
response within the Legal Committee of the International Maritime Organisation 
(hereinafter ‘IMO’),which culminated in1989 with the adoption of a new International 
Convention on Salvage, 75 remedying the inherent weaknesses of the International 
Salvage Convention 1910 (also known as the Brussels Convention) which provided 
for a strict no cure-no pay salvage regime. 
In 1980, as a result of the perceived weaknesses76 of the Brussels Convention, the 
LOF 1980 77  England introduced two concepts. These concepts were known as 
‘enhanced award’ and ‘safety net.’Both concepts are applicable only in salvage or 
attempted salvage operations of oil tankers, oil laden ships and tankers with cargo of 
oil.78The safety net guaranteed the payment of salvors’ expenses if the value of the 
salved property was inadequate to offset the salvage reward and a salvor may also 
receive an increment of fifteen percent of his expenses if he has succeeded in 
minimising or preventing environmental pollution. 79The safety net was payable by 
the owners of the ships. A salvor’s award is ‘enhanced’ if he saved maritime property 
in addition to preventing pollution. However, the concepts were only used in the 
salvage of oil laden ships. 
The uniqueness of these concepts was that they departed from the general rule of ‘No 
Cure – No Pay’ by providing incentives to the salvors. These provisions introduced 
into Article 1 of the Lloyd’s Form include a specific agreement on the part of the 
contractor (salvor) to use his best endeavours to prevent the escape of oil from the 
vessel while performing the services of salving the vessel, cargo, bunkers and 
stores.80The ‘best endeavours’ obligation of salvors is replicated in the recent LOF 
2011, the Special Compensation Protection and Indemnity Club Clause (hereinafter 
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SCOPIC)81 agreement and clause 4.6 of the Lloyds Standard Salvage and Arbitration 
Clauses (hereinafter ‘LSSA Clauses’).82 
There is a conundrum as to the ‘precise meaning of best endeavours’ 83  as 
encapsulated in the LOF.Rhidian Thomas argues that the ‘best endeavours’ principle  
might be subject to diverse interpretations or linguistic formulations such as 
‘reasonable care’, ‘due care’, ‘reasonable endeavours’ and ‘all reasonable endeavours 
as amplified in Article 8(1) of the International Salvage Convention 1989. 84 
Unfortunately, courts in the UK are yet to elucidate on ‘best endeavours’ in salvage 
cases. Recourse can be found in judicial authorities in other areas of law wherein ‘best 
endeavours’ were the focus of UK Courts.85 
 In 1989, the International Convention on Salvage was formally agreed upon in 
London. It came into force internationally on 1 July 1996. However, it was enacted 
into English Law by the Merchant Shipping (Salvage and Pollution) Act 199486 and 
this came into force in the UK on 1 January 1995. In the UK parties can contract out 
of the Act, or part of it, notwithstanding any contractual provision.87The Salvage 
Convention is the basis or foundation of the various statutes governing the law of 
Salvage in the UK. 
Under the International Salvage Convention 1989,the key Articles concerned with 
environmental protection are 1, 8, 12, 13 and 14.  Article1 defines ‘damage to the 
environment’ as‘substantial physical damage to human health or to marine life or 
resources in coastal or inland waters or areas adjacent thereto, caused by pollution, 
contamination, fire, explosion or similar major incidents.’This definition is different 
from the one found in Salvage Convention 1910 on the basis that ‘damage to 
environment’ has been extended to other hazardous substances apart from oil.88 The 
damage must also have occurred in coastal areas or inland waters or areas adjacent 
thereto. If pollution occurs on the high seas, the 1989 Convention will not be 
applicable. 
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A major flaw89 is the phrase, ‘Damage to the Environment’ – Substantial Physical 
Damage’ contained in Article 1(d) of the Convention.  Brice90 posits that it is intended 
to exclude trivial damage. Thus, it must also be of a -  
physical character and presumably eliminates cases where the only 
environmental harm alleged involves loss of visual amenity, e.g. due to the 
presence of an unsightly wreck in an area of beauty.91 
However, the Comite Maritime International (hereinafter ‘CMI’) 92 reportprovides 
some insight as to what ‘substantial physical damage’ refers to. It states thus: 
it is intended to make it clear that the definition does not include damage to 
any particular person or installation. There must be risk of damage of a more 
general nature in the area concerned. It must be a risk of substantial 
damage.93 
In the author’s opinion, another flaw is the use of the phrase ‘Coastal or Inland Waters’ 
by virtue of Article 1(d) of the Convention. This particular provision in the author’s 
view is too restrictive by expressly mentioning coastal or inland waters; it excludes 
other types of navigable waters. Therefore, the Convention is not applicable to 
exclusive economic zones, high seas and other navigable waters. Furthermore, in the 
UK, salvage operations in inland waters wherein the vessels are used for inland 
navigation and salvage operations in inland waters (where no ships are involved) are 
expressly excluded from the scope of application of the Salvage Convention 1989 by 
virtue of Schedule 11 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995. 94  This restriction or 
reservation entered by the UK in respect of salvage operations in inland waters will be 
a disincentive in salvage matters brought before English Court or tribunals because 
such cases will be decided on the basis of English Law and not the Salvage 
Convention. 
 Article 8(1) (b) of 1989 Convention, states that a salvor in performing the duties 
specified in sub-paragraph (a) must carry out the salvage operations with due care. 
Also, Article 8(2) (b) states that the owner of a ship must also exercise due care to 
prevent or minimise damage to the environment. Article 12 (1) states that successful 
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salvage operations are entitled to a reward. Thus, salvors are supposed to consider the 
impact of their salvage activities on the environment. 
Articles 13 and 14 form the fulcrum of environmental protection in the Convention. 
The provisions contain modified versions of the enhanced and safety net awards.95 
Article 13 lists out the indexes relevant for the calculation of salvage remuneration. 
Amongst these indexes, that  –the ‘skills and efforts of salvors in preventing damage 
to the environment’ 96 which would be taken into account in assessing property 
salvaged by way of an enhanced award.97Arguably, the basis for this provision is to 
encourage salvors to go and assist ships that threaten the environment.98 Thus, the 
salvors must prove that they actually prevented damage to the environment.99 Here, 
the salvors will not be entitled to any reward under this provision ‘if those efforts turn 
out to be of no avail.’100 
By virtue of Article 13(2), payment of the reward must be in proportion to the 
respective values of salved property. In the UK, in tandem with the proviso in Article 
13(2), Article 4 of Part II, Schedule11 of Merchant Shipping Act 1995 states - there is 
no obligation to fix a reward up to the maximum salved value under Article 13 before 
assessing special compensation to be paid. The underwriters of ship and cargo pay the 
award accruing from this provision, notwithstanding that they do not insure a vessel 
owner for damage to the environment.101 
Furthermore, Article 13(3) states that the reward shall not exceed the value of the 
vessel and other property. The value of the reward will be affected by the value of the 
property salved. 102  Thus, in cases where there ‘is a threat of damage to the 
environment, values of the salved property are often low and the expense of salvage 
high.’ 103  Arguably, this provision will be a disincentive to salvors in salvage 
operations. 
Article 14 creates a completely new extra-contractual legal right of recovery and it is 
known as Special Compensation provision.104 Special Compensation under Article 14 
is said to be: 
the most significant modification introduced by the 1989 Salvage 
Convention in the Law of Salvage and aims at providing incentives for the 
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salvors to get involved in incidents where pollution is threatened, even if 
there is a risk that very little or no property will be eventually salved.105 
A salvor is entitled to special compensation under Article 14 (1) if he does not get 
rewarded under Article 13 in respect of a vessel or cargo which threatened the 
environment. Under Article 14 (2), if a salvor prevented or minimised damage to the 
environment, the special compensation payable by the owner maybe increased to a 
maximum of thirty percent of expenses incurred by salvor. A tribunal may however 
further increase it but shall not exceed one hundred percent of expenses incurred by 
salvor. The expenses incurred by the salvors are termed ‘out of pocket’ expenses and 
are guided by the provisions of Article 14(3) of the Convention. It is been contended 
that ‘out of pocket’ expenses of salvors are “fairly easily ascertained.’106 It could 
entail the ‘out of pocket expenses’ or monies reasonably incurred by a salvor for the 
equipment and personnel used in the salvage operation. For example, monies or 
expenses expended on the hire of salvage equipment or fuel (petrol oil) consumed 
during the course of the salvage operation.107 
Article 14(4) states that special compensation shall be paid to the salvor if it is greater 
than any reward recoverable by the salvor under Article 13. 108 Here, special 
compensation is akin to a ‘safety net, wherein ‘a minimum payment to the salvor, one 
that took away some of the risk endemic in a “no cure no pay” situation’.109 The 
amount paid as special compensation is the amount of ‘assessed compensation that is 
greater than any salvage reward recoverable (not recovered) under Article 13’.110 
Under Article 14, only the ship owner is liable for the payment of the special 
compensation to salvors. This is unlike the scenario under Article 13, wherein the ship, 
cargo and freight owners among other relevant parties will be liable for the payment 
of the salvage reward. 
In 1991, a tanker, the ABT Summer caught fire and exploded in the mid-Atlantic off 
Central Africa.111The salvors who rescued the vessel were held not entitled to special 
compensation on the basis that the leaking oil did not cause damage to the 
environment within the meaning of Article 1(d) of Salvage Convention 1989.112 In so 
far, as this provision remains, it will serve as a disincentive to salvors in rescuing 
ships on other navigable waters. Willmer QC posits that having regard to the 
prevailing wind and current, a ship spilling thousands of tons of oil or noxious 
chemicals, even though far out at sea, nevertheless threatened to damage marine life 
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or resources in coastal waters or areas thereto.113This view is a well-reasoned and in 
the author’s opinion, the correct view. 
An inherent weakness in the Convention is ‘threatened damage’ which is found in 
Article 14(1) of the International Salvage Convention 1989. Arguably, this phrase is 
ambiguous, and it is been argued whether a real danger or an apprehension of danger 
is sufficient. If a circumstance was erroneously suspected of being dangerous, one 
would have to assess whether such error was reasonable or not at the relevant 
time. 114 Lloyd’s arbitrators treat ‘threatened damage’ to mean ‘if there was a 
reasonable apprehension of a danger of such damage at the time of the salvor’s initial 
response.’115The probable reason behind this approach is for it to act as an incentive 
to salvors. 
Another disincentive in the International Salvage Convention 1989 is the use of the 
phrase ‘out of pocket expenses.’ Article 14 (3) of the Convention is very problematic 
and controversial. The provision states – 
Salvor's expenses for the purpose of paragraphs 1 and 2 mean sout-
of-pocket expenses reasonably incurred by the salvor in the salvage 
operation and a fair rate for equipment and personnel actually used in 
the salvage operation, taking into consideration the criteria set out in 
Article 13, paragraph 1 (h), (i) and (j). 
The issue of out-of-pocket expenses arose in the case of the Nagasaki Spirit, where 
the Court referred to the fair rate of equipment.116 At this point, the -  
 issue was whether in assessing a ‘fair rate’ for the salvor’s own craft, 
equipment, personnel, etc, it was permissible to include a market or 
profitable rate, or whether the salvor was entitled solely to 
reimbursement of expenditure.117 
The House of Lords in affirming the decisions of the lower Courts held that ‘out-of-
pocket expenses’ means a fair rate of expenditure and that profitability is not a 
criterion in calculating the remuneration.Lord Mustilldescribed the intention of the 
legislation thus as: 
 [t]he only structural change in the scheme is that the incentive is now made 
more attractive by the possibility of obtaining new financial recognition for 
conferring a new type of incidental benefit.118 
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 Salvors were in disagreement with the way in which the remuneration was computed 
in The Nagasaki Spirit to their detriment for a number of reasons. Salvors contended 
that the decision in The Nagasaki Spirit disregarded the losses suffered by them in 
maintaining their (very expensive) specialist equipment in preparation for salvage 
operations until danger to the environment is eliminated.119 The salvors’ contention 
was that: ‘such advance capital provision cannot be compensated, in their opinion, 
without allowance of an element of profit in the fair rate of Article14.’120 In the 
author’s view, Article 14 of the International Salvage Convention 1989 was 
inelegantly drafted and this led to the diverse interpretations of Article 14.  Lord 
Mustill who defended his judgement at a debate held at the London Shipping Law 
Centre on 19 June 1997averred that draftsmen of the Convention were to blame 
because ‘he was only the pianist who had to perform the music composed by someone 
else.’121 
To resolve the challenges induced by the provisions of Article 14 of the International 
Salvage Convention 1989, the maritime industry (salvors, protection and indemnity 
clubs, insurers, and other parties) came up with a unique solution; Special 
Compensation P and I Club Clause (SCOPIC) (SCOPIC).SCOPIC isa framework or 
agreement between salvors and ship owners for assessing remuneration based on pre-
agreed rates. It can be invoked at any time and the parties may contract out of the 
Convention by incorporating the agreement into the LOF contract, so this dispenses 
with the assessment procedures in Article 14 of the Convention. SCOPIC came into 
effect in August 1999.122One of the distinctive features of the SCOPIC is that ship 
owners may appoint a Special Casualty Representative (hereinafter ‘SCR’) who is an 
independent expert or adviser to the owner and to report on the salvage operations.123 
The salvage master or salvor is in charge of the salvage operation; however the SCR 
plays major roles in the operation. For example, the SCR is expected to send daily 
dissenting report to the ship owner if he does not agree with the daily reports prepared 
and sent to the ship owner by the salvage master.124 Thus, the presence of the SCR is 
expected to improve transparency in the salvage operation thereby preventing 
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unscrupulous salvors from increasing their remuneration or reward.125 However, the 
major disincentive inherent is that the SCR owe his or her allegiance to the ship 
owner and not the salvors. 
From its inception in 1999 to March 2007, there were 844 LOF cases, of which 165 
incorporated the SCOPIC clause and it has been invoked on 182 occasions, however, 
only five SCOPIC cases have gone to arbitration.126In April 2011, there were 1085 
LOF cases; herein, the SCOPIC clause was invoked on 255 occasions and only seven 
were SCOPIC related arbitration cases.127 
The Fixed Cost Arbitration Procedure (hereinafter ‘FCAP’) (which started on 3 May 
2005) was introduced as an alternative procedure to the established Lloyd’s salvage 
arbitration and it was as a result of complaints about the expenses and complexity of 
the LOF salvage arbitration.128 The falling use of the LOF contract was a factor for 
establishing the FCAP.129 
        5. Proposed Reforms 
 From the analysis of the problems associated with some provisions regarding 
environmental protection in the Convention, reforms are urgently required to remedy 
its inherent weaknesses. Firstly, SCOPIC should be strengthened by making it part of 
the International Salvage Convention 1989. This can be done by way of an 
amendment to the Convention by incorporating SCOPIC which is presently a 
voluntary agreement into it. By making it part of the Convention, it will become 
mandatory for every ratifying State to abide by it.  
The FCAP is an optional guide to arbitrators and therefore the choice between the 
LOF salvage arbitration and FCAP will be determined by the parties or in the event of 
default, by the arbitrator.130 Accordingly, ‘the essence of the new FCAP procedure is 
that it is a fixed cost arbitration conducted speedily on the basis of evidence only’.131 
The FCAP is necessary to remedy the deficiencies of the ‘LOF’, the onus is on the 
salvage industry to make use of it. The author strongly supports the FCAP as an 
alternative to the LOF arbitration process. 
Article 1 of Salvage Convention 1989 which limits the jurisdiction of environmental 
salvage to ‘coastal or inland waters or areas adjacent thereto’ should be reformed. 
This provision should be rectified by adding the high seas, exclusive economic zones 
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and other navigable waters. This was the position in the LOF 1980 which extended 
pollution damage to include those from vessels in the high seas. The present position 
in the Convention serves as a serious disincentive to would-be salvors in the high seas, 
because they are not entitled to environmental salvage remuneration in the high seas.  
Historically, ships can enter the nearest ports, bays, or other waters located within the 
sovereignty of a coastal state to avoid storms and repairs132 and under customary 
international law foreign vessels in distress have a right to seek refuge in the ports or 
waters that were not the intended destination.133Unfortunately, this rule is not the 
norm in salvage operations affecting the environment. In the Irish case of MV Toledo, 
the court held that even though the right to refuge exists, a state has the power to 
legally refuse the entry of a ship if it poses significant harm to the state or its 
citizens.134Thus, by refusing entry to such ships in distress may lead to such ships 
discharging their oil waste in the high seas, thus leading to severe environmental 
consequences. 
 To mitigate this problem, the IMO has adopted two resolutions to the effect.135 The 
first is Resolution A.949 (23) Guidelines on places of refuge for ships in need of 
assistance136which is used when a ship is in need of help but safety of life is not 
involved. It recognises that if a ship is involved in an accident, the solution is to 
transfer its cargo and bunkers and repair it at the place of refuge.137 States might 
object to it on the basis of environmental and economic reasons.138 For example, if the 
environmental and economic impact of such vessels on the country of refuge is 
deemed to be detrimental to the interests of that country, it may deny entrance to its 
waters to the stricken vessel. Hence, if the sea shore or coastal area is affected by oil 
pollution, tourism and vegetation and animals in such waters will be negatively 
affected. InThe Prestige ship disaster, the Spanish Government ordered it away from 
its coast139 which unfortunately led to worse pollution occurring than earlier feared. 
Thus, States make such decisions on a case-by-case basis and ‘consideration would 
need to be given to balancing the interests of the affected ship with those of the 
environment’.140 
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The second resolution is A.950 (23) Maritime Assistance Services (MAS)141 which 
advises that all coastal States should establish a Maritime Assistance Service 
(hereinafter ‘MAS’) and whose functions would be to receive reports, monitor a ship 
situation and which will: 
serve as a point of contact between those in salvage operations undertaken by 
private facilities if the coastal State considers that it should monitor all 
phases of the operation.142 
The major flaw of the two Resolutions is that they are non-binding on States; thus 
they are mere recommendations. These guidelines may be used in the future as a basis 
of harmonising State policies on places of refuge. For example, it can be contended 
that these aforementioned guidelines are the inspiration for the place of refuge in 
salvage operations in the UK. In the UK, the Secretary of State’s Representative 
(hereinafter ‘SOSREP’) has ‘the powers to oversee and control and intervene in 
salvage operations within UK waters involving vessels or fixed platforms where there 
is significant risk of pollution.’143 The SOSREP is appointed by the Secretary of State 
on behalf of the UK Government.144 The powers of the SOSREP are enunciated in 
Schedule 3A of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 as amended by the Marine Safety 
Act 2003.145Also, SOSREP or the Maritime and Coastguard Agency have the task of 
directing stricken ships to appropriate places of refuge in the UK.146The SOSREP has 
had positive impacts on place of refuge in salvage operations in the UK. For example, 
in 2007 when the MSC Napoli which was affected by heavy flooding while transiting 
the English Channel on its way to South Africa was directed by the SOSREP in 
consultation with the French authorities to ground the ship on the beach line by 
Portland.147 This prompt action of the SOSREP resulted in minimal pollution and no 
loss of life was recorded. 148  The action taken by the SOSREP was universally 
applauded by relevant authorities in the salvage industry especially representatives of 
the European Commission.149 
Another proposed reform in the area of port of refuge is to create maritime or regional 
(national) zones. There should be a system of regional areas (ports, safe havens) 
where distressed ships can seek refuge and receive necessary services in relation to 
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human, vessel and environmental safety. 150  Zoning ‘is needed together with 
supporting infrastructure, contingency planning, risk assessment, and other services to 
enable informed and effective case-by-case responses’.151  In the European Union, 
places of refuge are actively encouraged. The European Directive 
2002/59/EC152establishes a system wherein national authorities in Member States are 
expected to collect information or data on ship movements and incidents and receive 
applications for entry into places of refuge.153 Here, each State has the powers to 
designate the suitable places of refuge by virtue of Article 20 of the Directive.154 
However, this Directive is not fool –proof. It has been criticised on the basis that –
‘ports have no reasonable incentive to admit ships in distress. The matter is dominated 
by legal uncertainty and this increases the risk of disasters occurring within Maritime 
Lepers.’155 To mitigate the harshness of the Maritime Leper syndrome, it has been 
suggested that an international convention that localises the interests of the 
stakeholders in the salvage industry be sought or enacted.156 In the author’s view, the 
two IMO Resolutions157 on places of refuge should serve as the foundation of any 
international convention that will be developed in the future to resolve the problem of 
the appropriate places of refuge in salvage operations and the interests of countries. 
This will also help in protecting the environment during salvage operations. 
Furthermore, due to the weaknesses in the international salvage regime with regards 
to the environment, scholars and stakeholders have advocated for the creation of a 
separate and distinct environmental salvage award. 158  The International Salvage 
Union contends that provisions of the International Salvage Convention on the 
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environment should be amended because it does not adequately reward salvors for 
their efforts in protecting the environment in salvage operations.159 Thus, the ISU 
believes that the creation of a separate salvage award will result in significant awards 
for the salvors reflecting the benefit they provide.160 On the hand, some stakeholders 
including the P&I Clubs (Protection & Indemnity Clubs who insure the liabilities of 
ship-owners) have argued that ‘the Special Compensation P&I Clause (SSCOPIC) 
adequately remunerates a salvor and that, should a separate salvage award be created, 
it would be problematic to quantify. There is also the question of who should fund 
such an award.’161 
Thus, in 2012, the National Maritime Law Associations which includes the members 
of theCMItook part in the fortieth Anniversary Conference of the CMI in Beijing, 
China.162 One of the themes at the Conference was a review of the International 
Salvage Convention 1989 as enunciated by the International Salvage Union 
(hereinafter ‘ISU’). 163  The major aim of the ISU was the creation of a new 
environmental salvage paradigm wherein the requirement of ‘the tribunal or arbitrator 
to make an appraisal of the extent and cost of damage to the environment which 
would have occurred if the ship had not been salved.’164 This was in contradistinction 
to the prevailing connotation of environmental protection in salvage operations 
wherein arbitrators assess the dangers to the ships or cargo from which the salvors 
have rescued them which requires ‘an appraisal of what did not happen, but which 
might have happened.’165 The Conference delegates emphasised the difficulties in 
computing damages to the environment in hypothetical scenarios and its financial 
implications, thus it was the consensus at the Conference that protection of the 
environment as currently enshrined in the International Salvage Convention 1989 
should be maintained. 
6. Conclusion 
Strictosensu, there is no pure environmental salvage award presently in the 
International Salvage Convention 1989. However, the Convention ascribes some 
marginal protection to environment in salvage operations. Also, notwithstanding the 
promotion of environmental protection as enshrined in the International Salvage 
Convention, many environmental disasters by ships and other similar vessels still 
occur till date. For there to be a full environmental salvage regime, the International 
Salvage Convention 1989 should be comprehensively reformed. Notwithstandingthe 
recent Beijing Conference, the International Salvage Convention 1989 and the 
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environmental protection paradigm remain bedevilled with structural and institutional 
shortcomings. 
The question at the core of this paper was whether the provisions of the International 
Salvage Convention 1989 adequately incentivise salvor’s efforts in the course of 
conducting salvage operations to prevent, or at least reduce pollution damage? 
Arguably, this objective would appear to be taken as a given due to the decision taken 
at the CMI’s Beijing Conference in 2012 to reject the notion of a separate 
environmental salvage award on the grounds that the salvors’ had not made out a 
sufficiently persuasive case for the amendment of the Convention to accommodate 
such a separate award. Thus, the Beijing Conference is not a light at the end of the 
tunnel for environmental protection or the development of a separate or distinct 
environmental salvage award. 
